Rubric · canonical · STATUTORY-INTERP-v3

Statutory interpretation under current SCOTUS precedent

For arguments about what a statute requires, given controlling cases. Not for arguments about what the statute should require.

Status canonical Criteria 4 (equally weighted) Updated March 14, 2026

When this rubric applies

The argument’s conclusion is about what a statute does or does not authorize, and the disagreement turns on text and precedent rather than on policy preferences. Topic classifier minimum: 0.75 on "statutory interpretation" tag plus presence of at least one named case in the extracted premises.

Not appropriate when: the disagreement is primarily empirical (use SCIENTIFIC-CLAIM), about whether a policy is wise (use POLICY-TRADEOFF), or about constitutional structure rather than a specific statute (use CONSTITUTIONAL-STRUCTURE).

Criteria

1. Fidelity to statutory text

weight 25%

Does the argument engage the actual words of the statute — defined terms, cross-references, and structural placement?

10Quotes and parses the operative provision; addresses defined terms and statutory structure. 7Cites the section but reads it loosely; misses one structural feature. 4Refers to the statute by name only; conclusions float free of text. 1Treats the statute as a mood, not a text.

2. Adherence to controlling SCOTUS precedent

weight 25%

Does the argument engage the cases that actually bind the question, including any post-2022 narrowing?

10Names controlling cases, applies their tests, and addresses any cases that cut the other way. 7Cites the right cases but skips a holding that complicates the conclusion. 4Cites a case that has since been narrowed without acknowledging the narrowing. 1No engagement with controlling precedent.

3. Logical structure and coherence

weight 25%

Do the premises actually support the conclusion, or is there a missing inferential step?

10Premises chain cleanly; assumptions are surfaced; the conclusion follows. 7One unstated assumption does material work but is plausible. 4An inferential gap (e.g., conflating moral duty with legal authority) carries the argument. 1Conclusion does not follow from premises.

4. Evidence vs. policy preference

weight 25%

When the argument cites evidence, is it evidence for the legal conclusion or for the policy outcome the speaker prefers?

10Evidence consists of statutory text, cases, legislative history, or interpretive canons. 7Mostly legal evidence with some policy framing. 4Real-world harms cited as if they decide a question of authority. 1Pure policy preference dressed as legal argument.

Version history

v3March 14, 2026 · updated criterion 2 to reflect Loper Bright
v2October 9, 2025 · rebalanced weights from 30/30/20/20 to equal
v1April 2, 2025 · initial publication

Runs using this rubric